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ARGUMENT
POINT I,
BOUNTIFUL CITY'S AND DAVIS COUNTY'S
ACTIONS DID NOT INVOLVE THE MANAGEMENT
OF FLOOD WATERS OR THE CONSTRUCTION,
REPAIR AND OPERATION OF A FLOOD AND
STORM SYSTEM.
A.

Bountiful City.
1.

Roadway.

The main thrust of Point I in Bountiful City's brief
is an argument that the decision to require construction of the
access road in one phase rather than three phases is an action
involving the management of flood waters or the construction,
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems.

Bountiful

City relies on the affidavits of Jack P. Balling, which state
inter alia:
4. One of the purposes of streets and the
purposes of curbs, gutters, inlet boxes storm
drain lines and storm detention basins are for
the collection and management of storm waters.
(Affidavit) (Respondent Bountiful City's
Brief, p. 15.)
This is Bountiful City's sole support for its proposition that
the decision to require the construction of the street in one
phase rather than three constituted a flood control decision.
Such an interpretation is untenable.
It is not the purpose of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 to
grant immunity to any city activity which impacts peripherally
on flooding.

If one accepts Bountiful City's position, any

activity of the City concerning road construction would be
granted immunity because it would impact slightly on flood

control.

This was clearly not the intent of the legislature.

It is obvious that the primary purpose of a road is to provide
for the movement of vehicular traffic, not flood control.

Jack

Balling, in his deposition, states that the reason why Bountiful
City required construction in one phase rather than three was to
provide access to the development.

The decision was not a flood

control decision.
Q.

What was the purpose for having the road be
completed all at one time? Why was it
required that the road be put in connecting
Bountiful Boulevard and Monarch Drive?

A.

That was in the ordinance. This property
lies within the boundary of what is called
the foothill ordinance, and in order to
develop it, it had to have two accesses.

(Jack Balling Depo. p. 85.)
Jack Balling then testified that the road was
constructed for the purpose of providing serviceability to the
subdivision, not flood control.
Q. Do you know what the purpose is behind
the ordinance requiring two accesses?
Or what is your understanding of the
reason for that?
A.

Well, I think the understanding of the
reason is so that, you know, you have
accessibilities for emergency vehicles,
fire, police, for the serviceability to
the lots that are in the area, without
having one way that could be obstructed
and then there not being any access into
that development. And we1re looking at
a long, big development. The maximum
length of any private dead-end street is
600 feet under our ordinance. When you
have an area longer than that, then it
has to have two accesses from both ends.
And particularly in the foothill
ordinance. It's specified in the

ordinance that you have to have access
from two different locations.
(Jack Balling Depo. pp. 88-9.)
It is well settled Utah law that deposition testimony
cannot be contradicted by a subsequent affidavit for purposes of
summary judgment.

Guardian State Bank v. Humpherys, 7 62 P.2d

1084, 1087 (Utah 1988); Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73
(Utah 1983).

In the instant case, Bountiful City attempts to

use the affidavit of Jack Balling in a manner that contradicts
his express deposition testimony.

Jack Balling, in his

deposition, states that the reason the road was required to be
constructed in one phase was to provide access to the Bridlewood
project.

The fact that a subsequent affidavit states a

different reason clearly illustrates that there is a genuine
issue of material fact regarding the purpose of the requirement.
Additionally, on page 15 of its brief, Bountiful City
attributes to the lower court a statement which is clearly not
included in the court's ruling.

The trial judge in granting the

motion for summary judgment never stated that it was quite
evident that the acts complained of in plaintiffs' First Amended
Complaint and the Amended Third-Party Complaint were in the management of flood waters or in the construction, repair and operation of flood and storm systems and involved acts or the failure
to act to do the acts of planning, designing, constructing
repairing and operating or managing flood waters.

The alleged

statement by the court is nowhere to be found in the record.
It should also be noted that the requirement that the
road be completed in a single phase was imposed prior to the

development of a regional detention basin-

In other words, even

if one were to assume that the access road was part of a flood
control system, the water collected from the road had nowhere to
go.

There was no destination point for the water to collect.

It is totally illogical to argue that it was a flood control
decision to put the road in all at once without showing that
there was someplace for the water to go.
2.

Absolute Immunity.

Bountiful City also argues that §6 3-30-3 grants a
governmental entity absolute rather than qualified immunity in
regard to the management of flood waters and the construction,
repair and operation of flood and storm systems.

Bountiful's

argument is premised on the fact that the flood control language
is contained in a separate paragraph.
It is incongruous to accept Bountiful City's argument
for a potentially limitless construction of the phrases
"management of flood waters" and "construction, repair and
operation of flood and storm systems" and also accept the City's
argument that this immunity is absolute and not subject to the
waiver provisions of the Act.

If absolute immunity was

intended, the legislature would have termed it absolute immunity
rather than a governmental function which in the preceding
paragraph of the same code section it defines as being subject
to certain enumerated waivers.
Additionally, the Governmental Immunity Act does not
grant any activity absolute immunity.

All immunity bestowed by

the Act pursuant to classification as a governmental function is

a qualified immunity.

If the legislature had intended such a

radical departure from existing statutory law, it would not have
merely tacked the amendment onto the existing language contained
in §63-30-3-

Rather, the legislature would obviously have

enacted a new and separate provision explicitly conferring
absolute immunity on certain governmental activities and
functions.

Because the amendment is made to a pre-existing

provision, the surviving language, terms and definitions of that
provision clearly apply to the amendment.
The foregoing principle of statutory construction is
well supported by existing Utah case law.

See Gleave v. Denver

and Rio Grande Western Railroad, 749 P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App.
1988), "[The court must] assume that each term in the statute
was used advisedly11; Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care Inc.,
679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984), "The best evidence of the true
intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Act is the
plain language of the Act.

The meaning of a part of an act

should harmonize with the purpose of the whole act.

Separate

parts of an act should not be construed in isolation from the
rest of the act"; Osuala v. Aetna Life and Cas., 608 P.2d 242,
243 (Utah 1980), "There are some cardinal rules of statutory
construction to be considered in relation to this controversy.
If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or
application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to
analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and
to harmonize its provision in accordance with the legislative
intent and purpose"; Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island

Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963, 964 (1966), "It is a
cardinal rule of statutory construction that all parts of the
enactment should be considered together so as to produce a
harmonious whole and to give effect to the intent and purpose
to be divined from the entire act."
Bountiful City has taken the position that the decision
to construct the road in one phase was a flood control decision
because a road has a peripheral relationship to a flood/storm
system.

Bountiful City then argues that its immunity for this

decision is absolute, not qualified.

The adoption of Bountiful

City's position would allow every City decision relating to a
road to be shielded by absolute immunity.

The fallacy of this

interpretation is illustrated by the very existence of §63-30-8
which waives governmental immunity for the defective condition
of a road.

Section 63-30-8 provides:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for any injury caused by a defective,
unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway,
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk,
culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other
structure located thereon.

The existence of this specific waiver provision and the
argument that a road is part of a storm system with decisions
concerning the road being shielded by absolute immunity are
simply incompatible.

The legislature surely did not intend to

grant an activity absolute immunity in one provision and then
proceed to waive that immunity in a subsequent provision.

To

render these provisions compatible either decisions concerning
road construction are not covered by the second paragraph of

§6 3-30-3, or the immunity bestowed in the second paragraph of
§6 3-30-3 is qualified rather than absolute.

In either case, the

trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Bountiful
City is not supported by law and must be reversed.
B.

Davis County.
In addressing the §63-30-3 argument, Davis County

divides its response into two distinct areas.

First, Davis

County argues that it had no involvement in the decision to
require the construction of an access road.

Second, Davis

County apparently admits that it delayed in getting the regional
detention basin on line, but asserts that it is immune from
liability pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3.
1.

Roadway.

Davis County attempts to claim that it had no involvement or control in respect to decisions involving the access
road.

Although Bountiful City may technically have had formal

control over the road issue, it is obvious that an informal or
tacit agreement existed between Bountiful City and Davis County
which granted Davis County substantial control in these types of
decisions.

This conclusion is supported by ample evidence.

For example, when the Bountiful City council granted
preliminary approval for the Bridlewood Subdivision, the
planning commission recommended that preliminary approval be
granted subject to the following conditions:
. . . (6) Developer to provide on-site storm
detention facilities to the satisfaction of
Bountiful City, Davis County and adjacent

property owners . . . (Emphasis added)
(Exhibit 90; Brief of Respondent Bountiful
City, Statement of Fact No. 2.)
It is thus apparent that from the inception of the Bridlewood
Project, Davis County had a substantial, albeit possibly
unofficial, role in relation to activities involving the
Bridlewood Project.
Davis County's involvement in the access road issue is
aptly illustrated by the following deposition testimony from
its own representative Sid Smith and the letter to which this
testimony refers.
Q.

Let me show you what has been marked as
Exhibit 98, and once again, I did not see
this as part of Commissioner Tippetts' file,
but it is a letter written by Commissioner
Tippetts to Douglas Todd of the Planning
Commission of Bountiful City and the letter
is dated May 30, 1985. Can you just glance
over that and let me know if you've ever seen
it before?

A.

I believe the first time I saw it was at
Mark Sandberg's deposition. I don't believe
I saw it before then.

Q.

Did you ever have any conversation with
Commissioner Tippetts about the contents of
this letter?

A.

Not that I recall. Could I look at it a
little more fully? I don't recall it and
most likely would not have discussed it,
because it strictly involved the roads and
I had no involvement in the roads whatsoever
at the time. (Emphasis added)

Q.

Based upon your experience in working with
Davis County in capacities that you have
worked, did you have an opinion as to why
Commissioner Tippetts is apparently injecting
hi elf into the design of the roadway and
whjy lie's talking with Bountiful City about
that? (Emphasis added)

A-

Most likely he had a concern for the unincorporated part of the county and the overall
traffic flow of the area. (Emphasis added)
(Sid Smith Depo. pp. 105-106.)

The letter which this deposition testimony refers to
was written by a Davis County commissioner to the Bountiful City
planning commission.

Courtesy copies were also sent to John

Booth, Bountiful Planning Director, and Jack Balling, Bountiful
City Engineer, as well as other officials of Davis County.

The

letter states in pertinent part:
It has come to our attention that the Bridlewood
Subdivision has been scheduled for some approvals
at your June 14 Planning Commission meeting. We
are a bit concerned in that it would appear that
flood control and street circulation considerations
have not been adequately addressed. . . . Both
the road circulation and flood considerations are
critical.
If approvals are contemplated for this subdivision
on June 4, may I respectfully request that they
be held in abeyance in order for Bountiful City
representatives, North Salt Lake City representatives, and appropriate individuals from Davis
County to have an opportunity to further evaluate
the requirements for a properly aligned road and
for addressing the flood control considerations.
Your cooperation and that of the Planning
Commission is respectfully requested. (R. 350-51;
Exhibit 98)
It is quite evident that Davis County did in fact exercise control over decisions respecting the Bridlewood
development or, in the very least, expected to be consulted with
and grant approval before any major decisions concerning the
Bridlewood project were undertaken.
Other deposition testimony also supports the abovestated conclusions.

For example, Mark Sandberg, one of the

developersf representatives, testified:

Q.

Who on behalf of your company studied
erosion control after or prior to the time
you made these cuts for the road in late
1985?

A.

Well, I don't understand the question.

Q.

Well, let me ask the question. Did anyone,
you or anyone from your company, study the
impact of cutting those roads?

A.

No, but we relied on the professional services of the Consortium. They were the
engineers for Bridlewood; they were the
professionals. We also relied on the professional input of Bountiful City and to a
lesser extent, Davis County.

(Emphasis added)

(Mark Sandberg Depo. p. 83.)

Clark Jenkins, another representative of the developers,
testified:
Q.

The development company agreed to make sure
it was passed by Davis County and approved?
What do you mean, stipulation of whom?

A.

I don't know if stipulation is the right
word, but anyway when we were annexed, there
was a dispute or an objection I guess from
North Salt Lake. And one of the problems
was storm. And so when we got it annexed,
it was agreed that both Davis County and
North Salt Lake would look at our plans and
make sure it met their standards as well as
Bountiful City. They also put a restriction
on us that, if I remember, and this is off
my mind, I think we were allowed--we had to
retain water and only be able to release
like 2 cfs, if I am not mistaken.
(Clark Jenkins Depo. p. 101.)

Q.

Yes. In other words, Bountiful was saying
"Until we have Davis County and North Salt
Lake satisfied, we're not going to approve
it"?

A.

That's right.

(Clark Jenkins Depo. p. 102.)
From the foregoing, it is clear that a substantial material fact issue exists concerning the control exercised by Davis

County over the Bridlewood project.

When such a genuine issue

of material fact exists, the granting of summary judgment is
clearly not appropriate.

Therefore, the trial court's entry of

judgment in favor of Davis County should be reversed.
2.

Delay.

Davis County argues that it is not liable for damage
occasioned by its delay in getting regional detention basin on
line, because governmental immunity applies not only to the
exercise of a governmental function, but also to the failure or
omission to exercise a governmental function.

In support of

this proposition, Davis County cites the case of Madsen v.
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).

In Madsen, the failure or

omission to act which was shielded by governmental immunity
concerned the defendants alleged failure to exercise a
statutory duty in supervising banks.
the situation presented here.

This is far different from

In this case, the evidence is not

simply that Davis County merely failed to act.

Rather, Davis

County acted improperly in several respects such as injecting
itself into the roadway construction issue, making promises it
did not keep, and foreclosing developers from constructing their
own detention basin.

Madsen clearly does not apply to these

actions.
Additionally, Madsen is further distinguishable because
it involved the failure of a state official to comply with an
affirmative statutory duty.
statute to act.

In other words, he was required by

"The commissioner and his department have the

duty (under the statutory law appurtenant to this controversy)

of supervising banks, including examining resources and
management annually . . ."
n. 2.

Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d at 628,

The instant case does not involve a mandated duty which

must be performed by a governmental official,
POINT II.
EVEN IF BOUNTIFUL CITY'S AND DAVIS COUNTY'S
ACTIVITIES ARE TERMED GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS,
THE STATUTORY WAIVERS REMAIN APPLICABLE.
A.

Bountiful City.
1.

Pleadings Sufficient.

Even if the court concludes that Bountiful City's and
Davis County's activities and decisions constituted governmental
functions, this does not end the inquiry.

The Governmental

Immunity Act specifically provides for waivers of said immunity
in certain circumstances.

In its brief, Bountiful City argues

that appellants are foreclosed from arguing a waiver under
§§63-30-8 and 63-30-9 because said waivers were not alleged in
plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and in Landforms' Amended
Third-Party Complaint.

Bountiful City's position is without

merit for several reasons.
First, essential facts were alleged in the pleadings.
A reading of the Amended Third-Party Complaint makes this clear.
Second, Bountiful City's claim ignores the fact that
this is not a motion to dismiss and this Court is obligated to
look beyond the face of the pleadings and decide this case based
upon the facts with all questions and all inferences resolved in
favor of third-party plaintiffs.
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings,

depositions, affidavits and omissions show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. If there is any doubt or
uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing
party. Thus, the court must evaluate all evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn
from the evidence in a light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment. Frisbee v.
K & K Constr. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984).
Third, the Cityfs argument ignores the axiomatic
concept of notice pleading.
the pleadings.

Every fact need not be set forth in

It would be a strange pleading indeed that first

affirmatively alleged defendant was entitled to government
immunity and then alleged why certain waivers or other reasons
made that very immunity inapplicable.
Fourth, Bountifulfs argument also ignores the fact that
the statutory waivers and all facts pertaining to this matter
were argued and briefed pursuant to the summary judgment
hearing.

(Record pp. 234-235, 384.)

Both sides argued the

meaning of the waiver provisions in the trial court.

No one at

the trial court level argued about any so called defects in the
pleadings.

Certainly, a claim that the pleadings are

insufficient is misplaced and cannot be argued for the first
time on appeal.

See Verret v. Deharpport, 621 P.2d 598, 603

(Or.App. 1980), "It is well settled that a party may not raise
the inadequacy of pleadings for the first time on appeal."

2.

Bountiful's Actions Were Not Purely Discretionary.

Bountiful City additionally argues that §63-30-10,
which provides for the waiver of immunity for injury caused by
the negligent act or omission of an employee does not apply
because the decision of whether to construct a regional
detention basin or not and the decision of whether to have a
road put in fully or in phases are discretionary functions.
This Court has noted that virtually all acts require
the exercise of some degree of discretion and that the
"statutory exception should be thus confined to those decisions
and acts occurring at the fbasic policy making level,' and not
extended to those acts and decisions taking place at the
operational level, or in other words, 'those which concern
routine, everyday matters, not requiring evaluation of broad
policy factors.'"

Gleave v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R.,

749 P.2d 660, 669 (Utah App. 1988), quoting Frank v. State, 613
P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980).
Bountiful City cites Gleave as authority for the
adoption of the following factors to be utilized in
distinguishing between functions at the policy making level from
those at the operational level.

In order for an act to be

purely discretionary, one must answer affirmatively to all of
the following four preliminary questions.
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or
decision necessarily involve the basic
governmental policy, program, or objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or
decision essential to the realization or

accomplishment of that policy, program, or
objective as opposed to one which would not
change the course or direction of the
policy program, or objective?
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require
the exercise of basic policy evaluation,
judgment, and expertise on the part of the
governmental agency involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency involved
possess the requisite constitutional,
statutory, or lawful authority and duty to
do or make the challenged act, omission,
or decision?
Gleave, 749 P.2d at 668, quoting Little v. Utah
State Div. of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51
(Utah 1983) .
Bountiful then argues that its activities at issue were
purely discretionary because they satisfied the preceding four
factors.

This argument is fallacious because the City's actions

did not require an affirmative answer to all of the preceding
four questions.
First, the challenged acts, requiring a road to be
built in one phase rather than three phases and the foreclosing
of the option to build an on-site detention basin, did not
involve basic governmental policies, programs or objectives.
Bountiful City argues that a "coherent, workable street plan is
a policy of the city."

Even if this is true, it begs the issue.

Clearly, the requirement that the road in question be
constructed in one phase rather than three was not a basic
governmental policy, program or objective.

Additionally,

Bountiful argues that "A flood control system utilizing streets
and detention basins is a governmental program and objective."
Again, this does not satisfy the test.

As evidenced by Jack

Balling!s deposition testimony, the roadway in this case was not
a flood control component.
Second, one must analyze whether the decision was
essential to the realization or accomplishment of the policy as
opposed to one which would not change the course or direction of
the policy.

Clearly, the requirement that the road be

constructed in one phase rather than three would not change the
course or direction of the City's street plan policy.

The

street plan policy of the City represents a decision on where to
locate specific streets and highways.

It does not involve a

policy as to whether a street or highway should be constructed
in one rather than three phases.

Additionally, the requirement

that the developers tie into a non-existent regional detention
basin, as opposed to constructing their own on-site facilities,
was not a decision which would change the course or direction of
the City's flood control policy.
Third, the decision concerning the street and the
regional detention basin was not an exercise of basic policy
evaluation and judgment.

These were unnecessary requirements

imposed upon the developers by the City and County for no sound
reasons.

These decisions resulted in the plaintiffs' injury and

the landowners and developers should not be held liable for
these decisions.
Fourth, Bountiful City argues that its actions were
fully authorized by lawful authority.

Bountiful cites statutory

provisions illustrating that it had the authority to lay out
streets and improve subdivisions.

Even assuming this to be true,

these sections do not give the City express authority to require
the construction of a road in a single phase rather than three
phases-

Also, Bountiful argues that the plan of a regional

detention basin is pursuant to a countywide flood control system
authorized by a Davis County ordinance.

Again, even if one

assumed this to be true, it does not excuse the delay in getting
such a system on line which was the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs' injuries.

If the developer had been allowed to con-

struct an on-site basin as it was initially led to believe it
could, the injuries would not have resulted.
Because Bountiful's actions do not meet all four
requirements as set forth in Gleave, the actions are not purely
discretionary in nature and the immunity is therefore waived
under §63-30-10.
3.

Meaning of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10.5 (1988)

Bountiful City also argues that §6 3-30-10.5 of the
Governmental Immunity Act is unavailable to the developers for
two reasons, namely, that the statute cannot be applied
retroactively, and that the statute does not apply to suits
sounding in tort or negligence.

In so arguing, Bountiful

completely misses the point of the landowners' and developers'
position in respect to §63-30-10.5.
Third-party plaintiffs in their initial brief argue
that the legislature recognized the apparent conflict between
§63-30-3 and Article I, §22 of the Utah Constitution, and
specifically enacted Utah Code Ann. §6 3-30-10.5 to remedy the
situation.

Article I, §22 of the Utah Constitution states,

"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for a public use
without just compensation." Section 63-30-10.5 states:
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for the recovery of
compensation from the governmental entity
when the governmental entity has taken or
damaged private property without just compensation.
The language employed in both these provisions is strikingly
similar.

Clearly, the waiver contained in Utah Code Ann.

§63-30-10.5 makes Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 inapplicable in
circumstances which would be in conflict with Article I, §22 of
the Utah Constitution.
Third-party plaintiffs discussed the matter in their
initial brief to illustrate that the only logical interpretation
of §6 3-30-3 is that the immunity bestowed is qualified rather
than absolute.

If one concludes that absolute immunity was

intended, it would place the statute and the constitutional
provision hopelessly in conflict.

If the immunity provision was

termed absolute, the waiver provision could not operate to save
the Governmental Immunity Act from constitutional attack.
Third-party plaintiffs are not asserting that §63-30-10.5 should
be applied retroactively.

Rather the enactment of §6 3-30-10.5

illustrates that all of the activities listed under §63-30-3 and
classified as governmental functions are accorded qualified
rather than absolute immunity.
Bountiful City states that it is clear that the
activities covered under §63-30-10.5 are meant to cover only
those takings or damages occurring pursuant to the exercise of

the sovereign power of eminent domain.

How Bountiful City came

to this conclusion when the statute and case law are silent on
the point is unclear.

The cases cited by Bountiful City,

Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157
(1960), and Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354
P.2d 105 (1960), obviously do not apply to the 1987 statute.
Additionally, the cases do not purport to apply the predecessor
statute.

Therefore, Bountiful City's argument concerning

retroactivity is misplaced, and its reliance on 1960 cases to
construe a 1987 statute obviously does not merit consideration.
B.

Davis County.
Davis County does not argue any of these issues and

apparently does not dispute third-party plaintiffs' position on
these issues.
POINT III.
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS NOT
CONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 1, §22 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
A.

Bountiful City.
Bountiful City argues in its brief that the Utah

Supreme Court's position is that the constitutional guarantees
afforded by Article I Section 22 may not be realized by citizens
of the state because the legislature has failed to enact
enabling legislation.
The wisdom of Bountiful!s position is highly suspect.
The court would not purport to grant every citizen of Utah basic
property rights and leave the same citizens powerless to enforce
them.

Clearly, such a result would be unfair and unjust.

Bountiful not only fails to address the fundamental
policy questions at issue with respect to Article I Section 22,
but it also fails to discuss or distinguish the cases cited by
third-party plaintiffs at pages 36 and 37 of their initial
brief.

These cases hold that Article I

self-executing.

Section 22 is indeed

Significantly, Judge Greene, who just three

years ago analyzed this issue, so held.

Katsos v. Salt Lake

City Corp., 634 F.Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986).
Third-party plaintiffs admit there is a split of
authority regarding whether or not Article I Section 22 is selfexecuting.

However, it is submitted that the better reasoned

cases reached a just result, namely, Article I Section 22 is
self-executing and citizens who are promised basic property
rights under the Constitution are entitled to avail themselves
of their promised rights.
B.

Davis County.
Davis County completely missed the point of third-party

plaintiffs' argument that Utah Code Ann. §6 3-30-3 is unconstitutional in light of Article I, §22 of the Utah Constitution.
Davis County argues that 6 3-30-10.5 of the Governmental Immunity
Act is consistent with Article I, §22 and therefore the
Governmental Immunity Act is not in conflict with an express
constitutional provision.
To make such an argument, Davis County must concede
that the immunity bestowed by §63-30-3 involving "flood damages"
is qualified rather than absolute.

If the immunity was absolute,

§6 3-30-10.5 would not operate to save the Governmental Immunity

Act from constitutional attack which Davis County argues occurs.
Third-party plaintiffs agree with Davis County that the
immunity bestowed by §63-30-3 is qualified rather than absolute.
However, if the Court construes §6 3-30-3 as creating an absolute
immunity, it should also declare the statute unconstitutional
because it would then clearly be in direct conflict with
Article I Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
POINT IV.
THE UTAH COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT REQUIRES
THE INCLUSION OF ALL PARTIES ON A SPECIAL
VERDICT FORM EVEN IF THEY CANNOT BE
FORMALLY JOINED AS PARTIES IN THE ACTION.
A.

Bountiful City.
The Utah Comparative Fault Act requires the fault of

all parties to an occurrence to be compared at trial in order
for the fault of the respective parties to be accurately
apportioned.

Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-38 and 78-27-40 illustrate

that no defendant should be held liable for any amount in excess
of the proportion of fault actually attributable to that
defendant.

If Bountiful City and Davis County are not included

on the special verdict form, it is obvious that the landowners
and developers will be assessed a damage award that is in excess
of the proportion of fault actually attributable to them.
The Utah Supreme Court had an opportunity to consider
the propriety of apportioning fault under the Utah Comparative
Negligence Act to a non-party in Godesky v. Provo City Corp.,
690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984).

The case involved a personal injury

action brought by a roofer who was injured when he came into

contact with an electrical wire.
Pride Roofing Company (Pride).

The plaintiff was employed by

Pride was dismissed prior to

trial presumably due to the exclusivity of the workmen's
compensation remedy.

In other words, Pride was immune from

further liability.
The case went to the jury which found Provo City
Corporation, the owner of the electrical wire, 70% negligent.
The jury also found Monticello Investors, the owner of the
building, 20% negligent.

The jury also assessed 10% of the

fault to Pride, which was not a party to the action.

The case

was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court which affirmed the
decision in all respects.

In commenting upon the correctness of

the juryfs verdict, the court stated:
This is precisely what the jury did in this
case. It compared the negligence of Provo,
Monticello, and Pride and determined that
each actor's negligence concurred to cause
plaintiff's injury and that Pride's 10%
negligence did not supersede Provo's 70%
negligence as a matter of fact. Ic3. at 545.
The fact scenario in Godesky is analogous to the
instant case.

Pride was presumably dismissed prior to trial

due to its immunity under Workmen's Compensation.

Even though

Pride was not a party to the action, the trial court had the
jury apportion its negligence on the special verdict form
because Pride's activities contributed to the injury.

This

decision was confirmed on appeal by the Utah Supreme Court.

In

the instant case, assuming arguendo that Bountiful City and
Davis County are held to be immune, the jury must still have the
opportunity to assess the proportion of fault attributable to

them just as the jury in the Godesky case did with Pride.
In its brief, Bountiful City does not contest this point
but merely asserts that the Utah Comparative Fault Act does not
require the City to be a formal party to this lawsuit in order
for the jury to determine the City!s comparative fault.
Interestingly, the cases relied upon by the City are those
included in third-party plaintiffs* brief.

They all stand for

the proposition that the jury must have the opportunity to
consider the negligence of all parties whether or not they be
parties to the lawsuit.

Third-party plaintiffs agree with the

reasoning employed by the cases cited in BountifulTs brief, but
contend that both the City and County should remain as a named
defendant in this action in order for the jury to hear all
probative evidence and accurately assess the percentage of fault
attributable to Davis County and Bountiful City.
It is clear from the case law and treatises which have
been cited by both developers, landowners and Bountiful City
that to effectuate the principles of comparative negligence, all
parties contributing to the occurrence must have their fault
assessed on the special verdict form.

This is true whether or

not they could ultimately be held liable to the plaintiff in
damages.
More importantly, however, in determining comparative responsibility or comparative causation
it is not necessary to establish that all persons
included on the verdict form would be liable for
some or all of the damages attributable to their
conduct or their product. Indeed, in many
instances, it will not be possible to establish

liability for various reasons including immunity,
failure to join as a party, unknown identity,
statute of limitations, or numerous other possible causes. In determining whether not to
include additional parties on the verdict form,
the question is not whether a judgment would or
could be rendered against that person, but
whether or not his conduct or his product caused
or contributed to the action and injuries.
Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 726 P.2d 648, 65556 (Idaho 1985) .
Even if Bountiful City and Davis County are held to be
immune from a damage award in this case, it is clear that their
fault must be assessed by the jury to insure that a just result
is reached as was done in the Godesky case.

The purpose of gov-

ernmental immunity is to protect a government from damage awards,
not to shift liability to third parties.

The landowners and

developers must not be saddled with more liability than that
which is actually attributable to them.

If the governmental

entity is immune for its conduct, then that immunity impacts
identically on plaintiffs and defendants.

It represents

liability/damages that are uncollectible.

It does not mean that

a co-defendant, who is not a governmental entity and is
therefore not immune, has to assume liability for the
government's actions.

This is joint and several liability.

Joint and several liability has been abolished in Utah.
B.

Davis County.
Davis County does not argue the comparative fault issue

and therefore apparently acquiesces in the position of the
landowners and developers on this point.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as all other reasons,
specified by third-party plaintiffs in their initial brief, it
is respectfully submitted that the trial court's summary
judgment in favor of Bountiful City and Davis County should be
reversed and this matter should be remanded for trial against
all named parties, including Bountiful City and Davis CountyDATED this
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